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Remedying Financial Abuse
by Agents Under a Power of
Attorney for Finances
Although financial elder abuse is often
viewed as involving vulnerable victims,
most victims are competent.
By Michele M. Hughes
Introduction
Financial exploitation of older persons, including the
systematic depletion of bank accounts or other re-
sources for the benefit of the abuser, has been tagged
the "crime of the 90s."' The number of financial
exploitation cases will only continue to rise with the
arrival of the millennium, as the population contin-
ues to age. Despite the increase in financial abuse
cases, law enforcement officials remain reluctant to
pursue perpetrators of abuse, traditionally viewing
the situation as a family matter best resolved by civil
litigation. In turn, civil litigators may hesitate to take
on a case in which they must plead complex and
varied legal remedies. Because of concern with the
financial abuse of older persons, it is beneficial to
describe remedies an attorney could pursue to ad-
dress this growing problem. While this article refers
to many Wisconsin resources, the problem of finan-
cial abuse is recognized nationwide.
Michele M. Hughes has worked as a lawyer in the
public interest for 12 years, at the Coalition of
Wisconsin Aging Groups (Wisconsin), the Advocacy
Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc. (Florida), and
Western Wisconsin Legal Services.
Sadly, in more than eighty percent of cases, those
abused by an agent under a durable power of attor-
ney are victimized by relatives, most of whom are
immediate family members. 2 Although financial el-
der abuse is often viewed as involving vulnerable
victims, more often than not, the victims are compe-
tent. One national study of abuse patterns by agents
under a durable power of attorney for finances re-
vealed that 57 percent of the principals were
competent when the abuse occurred. The agents in
those cases misappropriated more than one half of
the principals' assets in 70 percent of the cases.3
Whether or not the victim is competent, and whether
or not the abuser is a family member, it is critical
that abusers be vigorously pursued. Financial abuse
is not only immoral; it is often criminal.
This article outlines various remedies an attor-
ney may use in pursuing an agent under a power of
attorney for finances who has misappropriated funds
or other property from the unsuspecting principal.
These legal actions include an action for breach of
the agent's fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, undue
influence, tortious interference with an expected in-
heritance, eviction, and to void a contract based on
lack of mental capacity to contract. Equitable rem-
edies may be available to the principal, including an
action to establish a constructive trust, and for an
accounting. A statutory remedy to petition the pro-
bate court to review the agent's performance may be
available. This article explains how the remedy of
surcharging the abusing agent can defray the victim's
legal fees in bringing a civil action against the agent.
In addition to the remedies outlined in this ar-
ticle, numerous other causes of action may occur to
the creative lawyer.4 An attorney will need to plead
multiple causes of action in most financial exploita-
tion cases. Before discussing these various remedies,
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the nature of the relationship between an agent and
his or her principal under a durable power of attor-
ney document and the general construction principles
of power of attorney for finances documents will be
discussed.
The Nature of the Relationship Between an
Agent and His or Her Principal Under a
Durable Power of Attorney
To pursue remedies for an agent's misappropriation
or other financial abuse, it is useful to understand
the nature of the agent/principal relationship created
by a power of attorney for finances document. This
relationship may be defined by statutory or common-
law provisions or both. Some state statutes
specifically define this relationship as an agency re-
lationship, where the agent is required to act in a
fiduciary capacity.'
Courts generally hold that an agent is a fiduciary
with respect to the matters within the scope of his or
her agency.6 The very relation implies that the prin-
cipal has reposed some trust or confidence in the
agent. Therefore, the agent is bound to exercise the
utmost good faith and loyalty toward his or her prin-
cipal. 7 The agent's duty is to act solely for the benefit
of the principal in all matters connected with his or
her agency. It is the duty of the agent to further the
principal's interests, even at the expense of the agent's
own interests in matters connected with the agency.'
The fact that an individual's execution of a power
of attorney for finances document creates an agency
relationship with the agent is important in many re-
spects in representing clients who have been
financially exploited by those agents. As will be
shown below, a practitioner may cite case law in-
volving other types of agents with fiduciary
obligations, such as trustees9 and real estate agents,
in briefing issues. In addition, selections from the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts and the Restatement
(Second) of Agency will undoubtedly prove useful
to support your arguments.
Construction of Power of Attorney
Documents Generally and of Gifting Clauses
General Construction
It is widely held that power of attorney documents
must be strictly construed. 10 Thus, courts hold that
the documents grant only those powers that are
clearly delineated or specified" or, alternatively
stated, those powers that are contained in the "four
corners of the document.' 1 2 It has even been said
that a power of attorney for finances document is
construed more strictly than an ordinary contract,
especially if the authorized agent is given broad au-
thority over all or much of the principal's property. 3
The strict construction principal is useful to an at-
torney whose client's assets have been stolen by his
or her chosen agent.
Gifting
A practitioner representing a victim of financial ex-
ploitation by an agent under a power of attorney for
finances will want to have a clear understanding of
his or her state's common or statutory law defining
an agent's authority to gift. Perpetrators unfailingly
raise a defense that the document allows the agent
to gift to himself, herself, or others. Courts have
uniformly held that unless the power of attorney
document contains a specific clause allowing the
agent to gift the principal's money to the agent or
contains a broad gifting power, the agent does not
have authority to gift to himself or herself. 4 Even
where a document authorizes the agent to sell and
convey property, the agent may not gift such prop-
erty unless the document contains gifting provisions
that are fairly specific."
A majority of courts that have considered the
issue have held that when a power of attorney for
finances document does not expressly authorize the
agent to make gifts to himself or herself, extrinsic
evidence of the principal's intent to allow such gifts
is not admissible; although at least one jurisdiction
has held that this is not a bright-line rule and that
the surrounding circumstances may be taken into
consideration. 6 Other courts have also considered
extrinsic circumstances, such as a pattern of gifting
prior to the execution of the document, in determin-
ing whether gifting is authorized under the document,
at least where the document is ambiguous on this
point. 17
The Restatement (Second) of Agency Section 34
Comment h (1958) provides that formal instruments,
including powers of attorney, "can be assumed to
spell out the intent of the principal accurately with a
high degree of particularity." It is assumed that the
document represents the entire understanding of the
parties. Dangerous powers, such as the power to
borrow money, will not be inferred unless it is rea-
sonably clear that this was intended.
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Furthermore, even if a power of attorney for fi-
nances document contains a clause granting the agent
broad gifting power, an agent nonetheless has a fi-
duciary duty of loyalty to the principal."8 Thus, an
agent may not gift to himself or herself or others
with impunity. The gifting must be consistent with
the terms and conditions of the gifting clause. Where
the gifting clause does not specify the nature and
amount of the gifts allowed, the agent nonetheless
has a fiduciary duty to act with the principal's ut-
most concern in mind, not the agent's.19 Finally, an
argument could be made that an agent who believes
he or she is authorized under the power of attorney
for finances document to gift to himself or others
has a duty to disclose those gifts and obtain consent
from the principal.2 °
Certainly, a principal may grant an agent broad
gifting powers. Experienced elder law practitioners use
power of attorney for finance documents to effectuate
an overall estate plan for an individual or couple. The
document may include provisions to allow the agent
to divest the principal's assets prior to a medical assis-
tance application. A substituted judgment standard
clause allowing the agent to substitute his or her own
judgment for the principal's, which even allows the
agent to choose a new agent if he or she becomes avail-
able to serve, may also be included. However, elder
law practitioners reserve use of such clauses for cases
where a married couple are principal and agent, the
couple has been happily married for many years, and
they trust one another completely. These clauses must
be drafted carefully in order to avoid a later challenge
to the agent's gifting authority.
A Petition to Review the Agent's
Performance
Some states provide a statutory cause of action that
allows any interested person to petition the probate
court to review whether the agent is performing his
or her duties in accordance with the terms of the
durable power of attorney. Typical remedies the court
may impose include directing the agent to act in ac-
cordance with the power of attorney document,
requiring the agent to report his or her actions to the
court periodically, or even rescinding the agent's
powers to act.21
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Because an agent owes a fiduciary duty to his or
her principal, a cause of action for breach of that
fiduciary duty may redress a wide variety of aber-
rant conduct by an agent.22 An agent is required to
act for the advancement of the interests of the prin-
cipal. The agents may not serve or acquire any private
interest of his or her own that is adverse to the inter-
ests of the principal without the principal's consent.23
The duty of the agent to the principal is one of ut-
most good faith and loyalty.2 4 Furthermore, agents,
as fiduciaries, are required to make full disclosure
to their principals of all information material to a
transaction. 21
An agent that breaches his or her fiduciary duty
may be liable in tort.2 All of the traditional tort dam-
ages are available, including punitive damages where
conduct is wanton or willful. 27 An agent who is dis-
honest may also forfeit his or her right to
compensation for those duties. 28
Conversion
Conversion is the wrongful or unauthorized exer-
cise of dominion or control over a chattel.29 A
conversion action is a tort.30 The tort of conversion
is "bottomed upon a tortious interference with pos-
sessory rights."' 31
An example of a case involving an agent under a
power of attorney for finances document is
Alexopoulos v. Dakouras3 2 in which the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the agent who failed to
account for the principal's funds was liable for con-
version. The court readily discounted as "bizarre"
the defendant's argument that general language in
the power of attorney document authorizing the
agent to dispose of the principal's money in the same
manner that the principal could do personally was
tantamount to a gift.33
Fraud or Misrepresentation
Litigants successfully brought a tort cause of action
for fraud against agents in both West Virginia34 and
Nebraska. 35 In the West Virginia case, a bank, as
executor of an estate, filed a declaratory judgment
action to determine ownership of funds in two joint
bank accounts that had rights of survivorship. The
trial court ruled that the funds were owned by the
defendant, the decedent's brotherinlaw, as the joint
tenant and survivor. Four nieces who were to inherit
under the decedent's will appealed, arguing that the
decedent and the defendant had a confidential rela-
tionship since the defendant was the decedent's
agent under a power of attorney for finances. They
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further argued that a confidential relationship cre-
ates a presumption of fraud where a fiduciary is
shown to have obtained any benefit from the fidu-
ciary relationship. The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals agreed, holding that, since the defendant
had failed to explain the necessity for placing pro-
ceeds of a sale of Treasury bills worth $30,000 in
the joint savings account or to show whether the
decedent had even been aware of, much less sanc-
tioned this action, he failed to meet his burden of
proving that the funds were a bona fide gift. 36
In the Nebraska case, an agent/attorney was found
to have fraudulently converted the principal's money
when he gifted $500,000 of to himself.37 The court
held that, although a plaintiff generally bears the bur-
den of establishing fraud, a fiduciary relationship may
nevertheless be sufficient to allow a finding of fraud
when, in the absence of such a status it could not be so
found. Thus, the party charged with fraud bears the
burden of going forward with the evidence.38
An Action for an Accounting
Under the common law of many states, an action
for an accounting as a separate and distinct cause of
action may be available.3 9 These cases are normally
premised on the principal that a fiduciary that ad-
ministers the property and affairs of another is subject
to an action for an accounting.40
Under the common law, an agent has a duty to
account to his principal. An agent must keep and
render accounts and, when called upon for an ac-
counting, has the burden of proving that she or he
properly disposed of funds that she or he is shown
to have received for her or his principal. 41 The rela-
tionship between a principal and an attorney-in-fact
can be analogized to the relationship between a trust
beneficiary and trustee. Thus, the agent bears the
burden of proving that he or she has properly dis-
posed of funds.
Actions for accounting are also available under
the statutes of a number of states. An individual who
serves as an agent under a power of attorney for fi-
nances document and later becomes a personal
representative or guardian may be ordered to ap-
pear and account to the court.
A Constructive Trust as an Equitable
Remedy
A court of equity imposes a constructive trust to pre-
vent the unjust enrichment of one who receives a
benefit, the retention of which would be unjust as
against the other party. One seeking a constructive
trust must establish both the elements of unjust en-
richment and that the other party obtained or
retained the benefit by means of actual or con-
structive fraud, duress, abuse of a confidential
relationship, mistake, commission of a wrong, or
other unconscionable conduct.42 A court will impose
a constructive trust only if the plaintiff shows that
(1) title to the property is held by someone who, in
equity and good conscience, should not be entitled
to its beneficial enjoyment; and (2) title was obtained
by means of actual or constructive fraud, duress,
abuse of a confidential relationship, mistake, com-
mission of a wrong, or any form of unconscionable
conduct. 43
In Johnson v. Johnson,44 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals imposed a constructive trust on $140,000
of a $203,000 pre-death transfer by an adult daugh-
ter from the assets of her mother. The court held
that the daughter, as alternate agent under her
mother's power of attorney for finances, had a con-
fidential relationship with her mother that she abused
by allowing her mother to transfer funds to her while
knowing that her mother's death was imminent.45
However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals re-
fused to impose a constructive trust in somewhat
similar circumstances in In re Estate of Fliss.a Prior
to his death, a man transferred all of his property to
his daughter, giving nothing to his three other chil-
dren. He granted the daughter a durable power of
attorney. He retained an attorney to quit-claim two
parcels of real property to the daughter and retained
a life estate. He also transferred all of his bank ac-
counts into joint or payment on demand accounts
with his daughter. The court did not impose a con-
structive trust in this situation, relying in part on the
testimony of the attorney who had prepared the le-
gal documents and who testified that he saw no
evidence that the father had been unduly influenced
by the daughter and that the father wanted to avoid
probate.47
A principal who has given a durable power of
attorney to another often retains sufficient mental
capacity to transact many of his or her own affairs,
despite the fact that his or her agent is also actively
managing the principal's affairs. In one such case,
the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to impose a
constructive trust on funds placed into a joint
survivorship account between a father/principal and
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son/agent, in part because the principal appeared to
be quite capable of evaluating financial transac-
tions. 48 The court recognized that the agent may not
profit from the agency relationship to the detriment
of his principal or have a personal stake that con-
flicts with the principal's interest in a transaction in
which the agent represents the principal. However,
the court reasoned that the funds were placed in the
joint account by the principal, who continued to
actively handle his financial affairs, despite the ex-
istence of the power of attorney with his son.
An Action for Surcharge Against the Agent
for Lost Income or Attorney's Fees
In some states, a court may exercise its equity pow-
ers to impose a surcharge against a trustee, personal
representative, or guardian for mismanagement of a
principal's, beneficiary's, or ward's estate. 49 This sur-
charge may include a fee for income lost as a result
of mismanagement of funds and may require the fi-
duciary to pay attorney's fees. 0
These theories are applicable to an agent under a
power of attorney for finances as well. Thus, a court in
its equity jurisdiction could impose a surcharge on an
agent for mismanagement of the principal's assets as
part of an action for an accounting or other action. An
interested person could also bring a lawsuit against
the agent for conversion or breach of fiduciary duty,
and seek reimbursement for his or her attorney's fees.
In one state, the interested party must allege that the
agent committed bad faith, fraud, deliberate dishon-
esty, or extreme mismanagement of the funds before
attorney's fees may be awarded."1
Undue Influence
Undue influence is considered a species of fraud. 2
In most cases, proof of undue influence will rest solely
on circumstantial evidence. 3 The basic question in
undue influence is whether the free agency of the
subject individual has been destroyed.5 4 States typi-
cally require the plaintiff to prove some combination
of elements, including susceptibility, opportunity and
disposition to influence, suspicious circumstances,
coveted result, and/or a confidential or fiduciary
relationship.
Most undue influence cases involve will contests.
However, in some states, undue influence in the ex-
ecution of an inter vivos conveyance is proved in the
same way that undue influence is proved in the ex-
ecution of a will.55
In many jurisdictions, courts give the case height-
ened scrutiny where a power of attorney for finances
agent is involved in unduly influencing the princi-
pal. However, in other jurisdictions, no presumption
of undue influence results from the execution of a
power of attorney for finances."6
In an Oregon case, the court found that an adult
son, who was named as agent under his elderly
mother's power of attorney for finances document,
exercised undue influence in procuring the deed to
his mother's home. 7 The son convinced his mother
that, because she was receiving Medicaid, the state
would take her house if she kept it titled in her
name.58 The son, in fact, knew that the state would
not take her home away from her as long as it was
her primary residence.5 9 After his mother had been
hospitalized three times in the span of one year, the
son drove his mother to a title company where he
filled out a warranty deed transferring title from his
mother to himself.60 It was signed by the mother,
notarized, and recorded. The court held that the ex-
istence of a power of attorney establishes a
confidential relationship between the agent and the
principal, which in turn raises an inference of undue
influence. Notably, the court considered the fact that
the son never encouraged his mother to seek inde-
pendent advice, thus breaching his fiduciary duty.61
In an Illinois case, a court held that an adult
daughter, serving as agent for her elderly mother
under a power of attorney for finances, failed to re-
but a presumption of undue influence in connection
with the transfer of property from mother to daugh-
ter.6 2 The daughter and the principal's second
husband, while acting as co-agents under the
principal's power of attorney for finances, transferred
funds from the principal's personal bank account to
a new account in which the two co-agents were joint
tenants. In addition, the home where the principal
and her husband lived as joint tenants was retitled
in the names of the daughter and the husband. After
the principal's husband died a few years after these
transfers took place, the principal's son from a pre-
vious marriage petitioned the court to nullify these
transfers on the grounds of fraud and undue influ-
ence. In Illinois, when a transaction pursuant to a
power of attorney for finances benefits the agent,
there is a presumption of fraud and undue influence.
The Illinois Court of Appeals overruled the trial
court's determination that the daughter had suc-
cessfully rebutted the presumption of fraud and
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undue influence and issued an order nullifying the
transfers.
In a second Illinois case, an Illinois appellate court
upheld the trial court's finding that the defendant
had exerted undue influence over a relative.63 A num-
ber of suspicious circumstances surrounded the
decedent's last year. First, the defendant convinced
the decedent to live with him and told another rela-
tive and a doctor that he would never let the decedent
go to a nursing home because they would take ev-
erything he had. The defendant took the decedent to
the bank to have all of the accounts transferred to
joint tenancy. On the same day the defendant took
the decedent to an attorney to have a deed to the
decedent's home transferred to the defendant. Finally,
the defendant told other relatives that relatives on
the decedent's side of the family didn't deserve any-
thing under the will.
In a Montana case, a neighbor was held to have
exerted undue influence over an elderly man, who was
especially vulnerable because he had recently lost his
wife of 53 years.64 The neighbor used a power of attor-
ney for finances document to obtain the man's house
and all the property therein, his car, and almost all of
his savings. The Montana Supreme Court held that
even though the principal may have been competent,
he was nonetheless unduly influenced by his neighbor.
Wisconsin is another jurisdiction where it is easier
to prove undue influence when the perpetrator is the
principal's agent under a power of attorney for fi-
nances document. This is because when the agent is
the perpetrator a major element in one of Wisconsin's
two tests for undue influence is established as a mat-
ter of law. In order to meet the test one must establish
the existence of (1) a confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship between the testator and the favored
beneficiary, and (2) suspicious circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the will or other
transaction. 6s A fiduciary relationship between the
principal and agent is established as a matter of law
when a person executes a power of attorney for fi-
nances. 66 Thus, if suspicious circumstances exist in
creation of the will or conveyance, the burden is
shifted to the perpetrator/agent to prove that he or
she did not unduly influence the principal/victim.
Voiding a Contract Based on the Principal's
Lack of Competence
If the power of attorney for finances document pro-
vides that the agent will be compensated, the
document is likely to be viewed as a contract and all
of the general contract defenses and remedies are
available to a principal who contracts with an agent
such as rescission, restitution, and unjust enrichment.
In some instances, the financial exploitation of the
older person occurs when he or she is either incompe-
tent or marginally competent. The agent may attempt
to convince the principal to enter into a contractual
relationship with the agent that is extremely favorable
to the agent. In one example, a personal care worker
became a 90-year-old man's agent under a power of
attorney for finances document and then "contracted"
with him to reimburse her for $35,000 worth of per-
sonal care she allegedly provided to him over a period
of three years. In such a situation, an action alleging
that the principal lacked mental capacity to enter into
the contract would be viable in some states.6 7
In most states, the law presumes competency
rather than incompetency; it will presume that every
person is fully competent until satisfactory proof to
the contrary is presented.68 The test for determining
incompetency is usually whether the person involved
has sufficient mental ability to know what he was
doing and to know the nature and consequences of
the transaction.69 Almost any conduct may be rel-
evant, as may lay opinions, expert opinions, and prior
and subsequent adjudications of incompetency.70
An issue may arise as to the perpetrator's knowl-
edge of the victim's incompetence. In some states,
the infancy doctrine, which holds that a minor who
disaffirms a contract may recover the purchase price
without liability for use, depreciation, or other dimi-
nution in value, does not apply in mental incapacity
to contract actions. 71 The adult mental incompetent
may be subject to varying degrees of infirmity or
mental illness, not all equally incapacitating. Thus,
absent fraud or knowledge of the incapacity by the
other contracting party, the contractual act of an
incompetent is voidable by the incompetent only if
avoidance accords with equitable principles.72 The
unadjudicated mental incompetence of one of the
parties is not a sufficient reason for setting aside an
executed contract if the parties cannot be restored
to their original positions, provided that the contract
was made in good faith, for a fair consideration, and
without knowledge of the incompetence. 73 The issue
of whether one party knows of the incompetence of
the other party may not be limited to actual knowl-
edge, but also whether the party had "reason to know
of the incompetence."74
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In some states, if a guardianship action has been
filed on behalf of a principal whose assets are being
depleted by an agent under a power of attorney for
finances document, all contracts, gifts, and transfers
of property, except for necessaries, are void after the
filing of the guardianship petition and order for hear-
ing with the office of the register of deeds for the
county. The only exceptions are if the court deter-
mines that the ward continues to be able to enter
into contracts in a limited guardianship or a guard-
ian is not appointed.
Duress
A claim for duress may be available in two situa-
tions: (1) as an affirmative defense or action to void
a contract, or (2) as an intentional tort. 7' Duress, in
its broadest sense, includes instances where a condi-
tion of mind, caused by fear of personal injury or
loss of limb or injury, is produced by the wrongful
conduct of another, rendering such person incompe-
tent to contract with the exercise of his or her free
will power. 76 There must be a full and free consent
by the parties to the terms of a contract. Duress in-
volves ". . . wrongful acts ... that compel a person
to manifest apparent assent to a transaction without
his volition or cause such fear as to preclude him
from exercising free will and judgment in entering
into a transaction." 77 If consent of the parties is ob-
tained through duress, that party may either void or
ratify the contract. 7
A claim for duress should be considered when-
ever the agent has used force or threat of force to
cause the principal to suffer financial loss to the ben-
efit of the agent. A claim for duress may be
appropriate when the principal has, for example,
changed his or her beneficiary on a life insurance
policy at the request of the agent, if threat of force
or veiled threats are involved. 79 Where the principal
has been coerced into changing title to his or her
home or other property, a claim for duress may also
be used to void the transaction. 0
Tortious Interference with an Expected
Inheritance
Some states have adopted the Restatement (Second)
of Torts Section 774B, which provides that one "who
by fraud, duress or other tortious means intention-
ally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift he would have other-
wise received is subject to liability to the other for
the loss of the inheritance or gift.""' The elements of
this cause of action are
1. Existence of the plaintiff's expectancy;
2. That the defendant intentionally interfered with
that expectancy;
3. That the conduct of the defendant, in and of it-
self, is tortious (e.g., fraud, defamation, bad faith,
or undue influence);
4. That there exists a reasonable certainty that the
testator would have left a particular legacy had
he or she not been persuaded by the defendant's
tortious conduct; and
5. Existence of damages.
An executor of an estate may consider such a
claim against an agent who has converted his
principal's assets thereby depriving rightful heirs of
their inheritance.
Eviction
Unfortunately, agent/abusers living with their victims/
principals is an all too common scenario. The victim
of financial abuse may be at a loss as to how to le-
gally remove the abuser from his or her home when
there is no formal lease agreement or rent paid. In
these circumstances, an attorney will want to research
how his or her state treats such holders. In some states
these individuals are treated as "tenants-at-will,"
defined as a tenant holding with the permission of
the landlord without a valid lease and under circum-
stances not involving periodic payment of rent. 2 The
tenancy-at-will terminates after service of a statu-
tory notice on the tenant and the notice period has
expired.
Federal Income Tax-Theft Loss as a
Deduction from Taxable Income
Federal tax rules allow theft as a categorical itemized
deduction to reduce federal taxable income. 3 Although
criminal charges need not be brought to obtain the
deduction, where the theft involves family members,
the deduction will be disallowed if there is no attempt
to gain reimbursement through civil action. 4 Legal
expenses and other consequential costs of the theft or
mismanagement may also be deducted as itemized
miscellaneous deductions to the extent they exceed 2
percent of adjusted gross income.
The remedy of tax deductions is especially use-
ful to offset the principal's tax penalty for early
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withdrawal of IRAs where the agent has embezzled
those IRAs. The costs/benefits of consulting a tax
specialist should be considered in cases where sub-
stantial assets have been stolen by an agent, in order
to properly draft the complaint.
Conclusion
Lawyers can provide a great service to their clients
and to their communities by vigorously pursuing
abusing financial agents. Despite common belief, fi-
nancial power of attorney documents are not blank
checks authorizing the agent to do with the principal's
assets as the agent wishes. In fact, the common law
provides a formidable body of case law clearly de-
fining the agent's fiduciary responsibility.
Additionally, many causes of action and remedies
are available, and, indeed, become easier to estab-
lish, as a result of the abuser acting as an agent under
a financial power of attorney document. With these
tools, lawyers can assure their clients' financial
security.
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